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Adoption assistance entitlements support the adoptions of children whose birth parents’ rights 
have been severed after abuse or neglect. The subsidies are meant to offset the extra cost to 
adoptive families of raising children whose adverse experiences have left them with special 
physical, emotional, or behavioral needs.  Previous studies of adoption assistance are limited in 
scope; I use administrative data on all recorded adoptions from foster care from 1996 through 
2003 to examine the distribution of adoption assistance across and within states.  The state-to-
state variation payments is large, even after controlling for differences in the cost of living.  
Moreover, although adoption assistance is an entitlement for children, payments made within 
many states are systematically correlated with the characteristics of adoptive families.  There is 
substantial evidence that the state administration of this federal entitlement leads to unequal 
treatment of similar children. 
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 The Distribution of a Federal Entitlement:  
The Case of Adoption Assistance 
 
Introduction 
States are currently responsible for finding adoptive families for almost 120,000 children 
in foster care (US DHHS, 2006a).  These children are victims of abuse and neglect by their birth 
parents and are subjected to the inherent insecurity of placement in foster care.  Family courts 
have ruled (or will soon rule) that the children’s best interests are served by severing their birth 
parents’ rights, freeing the children for adoption by families that are willing to help them find the 
places in society and the economy that most other children take for granted. 
Through a combination of federal and state laws, an adoptive family willing to parent one 
of these children can be reimbursed for the upfront expenses of the adoption, including 
administrative and legal fees.  A family can receive a substantial one-time tax credit to help 
establish the child’s place in the family home.  The child can receive Medicaid, and the family 
can receive assistance with extraordinary expenses related to the child’s special needs.  Finally, 
the child may be entitled to receive a monthly adoption assistance payment that the family may 
use to help defray the cost of raising the child to independence.   
More active use of adoption assistance, together with other changes in child welfare law, 
policy, and practice, led to a near-doubling in the number of children adopted from foster care in 
the 1990s, as shown in figure 1.  While every adopted child is not entitled to adoption assistance, 
most are, so the increase in adoptions caused the number of entitled children to grow rapidly.  In 
1988, just fewer than 35,000 children received adoption assistance (Sedlak and Broadhurst, 
1993).  The number may near 140,000 children by 2010 (Wulczyn and Hislop, 2002).    
Federal expenditure on adoption assistance has grown more than 2,000 times in the last 
two decades, from less than $400,000 in fiscal year 1981 to $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2002  2 
(Dalberth et al., 2005).   The federal adoption assistance budget grew 30 percent between 2000 
and 2002 alone and is expected to approach $2.5 billion by 2008 (Barth et al., 2006; Scarcella et 
al., 2004).  
But adoption is less expensive for government than long term foster care.  Adoption 
decreased administrative costs by $1.6 billion compared to continued foster care for the children 
adopted between 1983 and 1986 (Sedlak and Broadhurst, 1993).  The governmental cost of 
adoption may be less than half the cost of foster care (Barth et al., 2006), and movement towards 
contracting out adoption services to private agencies continues to improve cost efficiency 
(Blackstone et al., 2004).  Moreover, the benefits of adoption are not merely fiscal.  Adoption 
improves health, behavioral, educational, and employment outcomes for children relative to 
keeping them in long-term foster care (Triseliotis, 2002).  It is because adoption is a wise 
investment in children that states, and eventually the federal government, established the 
adoption assistance entitlement. 
Just as higher maintenance payments increase the quantity of foster parenting supplied 
(Delfabbro and Barber, 2004; Simon, 1975), adoption assistance has a positive effect on the 
number of families who choose to adopt from foster care (Dalberth et al., 2005; Hansen, 2005; 
Hansen and Hansen, 2006).  States cannot afford to retreat from a policy of supporting adoptions 
if they hope to meet the needs of the children waiting in foster care. 
Nonetheless, states feel the budget pressure of adoption support.  Fiscal stress led several 
states to put the brakes on adoption assistance spending in the first half of this decade (North 
American Council on Adoptable Children [NACAC], 2003; Eckholm, 2005).  Some of the cuts 
have been blocks by the courts, which have made it clear that adoptive parents have the legal 
standing to protect their children’s entitlements (E.C. v. Blunt (05-0726-CV-W-SOW) and  3 
A.S.W. v. Oregon (also known as A.S.W. v. Mink, 424 F. 3d 970 (9th Cir. 2005)).  These 
decisions effectively require states to consider more carefully how adoption assistance is 
distributed. 
Since the establishment of the adoption assistance entitlement in 1980 there have been 
questions about fairness in the distribution of benefits.  As with other social insurance programs, 
states set a basic level of adoption assistance payments.
1  States may also place limits on 
characteristics of children who qualify for entitlement.  The decisions of the states generate 
substantial variation in nominal adoption assistance payments between states (Dalberth et al., 
2005).  Moreover, in most states and in most cases, the basic rates are used as a guide, but the 
amount of adoption assistance is negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  While the intent of allowing 
negotiation is to provide flexibility, the result is that similar children are not similarly treated 
(Avery and Ferraro, 1997; Avery and Mont, 1992; Hansen and Pollack, 2005).   
Previous studies of adoption assistance are limited to single states or single years.  Here I 
produce the most comprehensive description possible, using data on all adoptions finalized after 
state agency involvement during fiscal years 1996 through 2003, as reported to the Children’s 
Bureau through the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS).   
The next sections summarize the history of the adoption assistance and the AFCARS 
adoption data.  I then describe the extent of state claims for federal funds for adoption assistance 
and the distribution of the amount of adoption assistance.  Following the descriptive statistics, I 
turn to the question of equal treatment in the distribution of adoption assistance payments.  The 
characteristics of the adoptive family have predictive power in a logit model of receipt of 
adoption assistance and contribute to explaining the amounts of the payments in a fixed effects 
model.  The effects of some characteristics of the adoptive families are as large as the effects of  4 
specific disabilities.  A random coefficients model detects differences in how states “price” 
characteristics of children and families.  Examination of the determinants of the payments on a 
state-by-state basis reveals a wide range of effects.  While systematic differences in payments 
based upon child characteristics may be consistent with the intent of the law, systematic 
differences correlated with characteristics of adoptive families are not.  In fact, consideration of 
the circumstances of the adoptive family is legally questionable (E.C. v. Blunt).  The final section 
concludes with suggestions for lawmakers, administrators, and researchers. 
 
Entitlements for Adopted Children 
Because child welfare is a matter of family law, it has historically been left to the states.  
As early as 1958, the Child Welfare League of America [CWLA] Standards for Adoption 
Services recommended that states assist families in their efforts to adopt.  States responded by 
establishing adoption assistance programs; California and New York were the first.  In 1975 the 
CWLA wrote its Model State Subsidized Adoption Act.  By the end of 1976, 42 state and local 
jurisdictions had enacted adoption assistance programs (Avery and Mont, 1992). 
State and local adoption assistance programs were problematic.  Assistance was available 
only for a limited time.  Moreover, because the programs were means tested, some prospective 
adoptive families viewed adoption assistance as a kind of welfare, with stigma attached.  Finally, 
state and local adoption administrators did not want to place children with adoptive families if 
the children qualified for federal foster care assistance.  For qualified children the federal 
government paid about half of the cost of foster care, but if the child was adopted with state or 
local adoption assistance, the state or locality would be responsible for all of the cost.   5 
  In 1978, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Reform Act: Title 
II—Adoption Opportunities (P.L. 95-266).  The Adoption Opportunities grants funded state and 
local programs to promote adoption: “The purpose of this Title is to facilitate the elimination of 
barriers to adoption and to provide permanent and loving home environments for children who 
would benefit by adoption, particularly children with special needs.”   
While the Adoption Opportunities program was small, its focus on children with special 
needs has carried forward into current law.  Special needs are characteristics of children that tend 
to make adoptive placement more difficult.  Each state defines its criteria for special needs in a 
different way within the broad federal guidelines. The NACAC (2006) details definitions for 
each state. 
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-272), also known as 
Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, established federal adoption assistance which provides 
matching funds on an entitlement basis to eligible children.  To be Title IV-E eligible a child’s 
family must have been eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children or the child must 
have been eligible for Supplemental Security Income at the time of removal from the home of 
the birth family.  The child must also have a state-defined special need.  If a child is Title IV-E 
eligible, the adoptive family can negotiate on the child’s behalf for receipt of monthly adoption 
assistance payments until the child is 18 years of age (21 in some states) or until the child is 
financially independent or leaves the adoptive home.
2  Congress intended the adoption assistance 
program to make it possible for a family to adopt a child with special needs without a decline in 
the standard of living of the family (Avery and Ferraro, 1997; Barth, 1997). 
The federal match for adoption assistance removed the disincentive for states to move 
children from foster care into adoptive families.  Further, because the Act based eligibility on the  6 
characteristics of the child rather than characteristics of the adoptive parents, it de-stigmatized 
adoption assistance. 
States receive federal reimbursement at the federal medical assistance percentage 
(FMAP) for the adoption assistance payments made to families.  The FMAP rates currently 
range from 50 to 76 percent (US DHHS, 2006d).  States with lower per capita income have 
higher matching rates, while states with higher per capita income have lower matching rates. The 
federal reimbursement for adoption assistance is capped at the maximum reimbursement for 
foster care payments that could be made on behalf of the child.   
Higher adoption subsidies can be paid using state or local dollars.  Also, if the child to be 
adopted is not Title IV-E eligible, the state may fund adoption assistance from its own budget.  
Each state’s budget for adoption assistance is appropriated by the state’s legislature.   
A study of families who adopted children from foster care in the mid-1980s found that 29 
percent said that they would have had had difficulty adopting their child(ren) without the 
subsidy, and 35 percent said the availability of assistance had a positive influence on the decision 
to adopt.  Twenty percent of families said that, despite adoption assistance, the child had to do 
without needed services or treatment because of tight family budgets; 28 percent of families 
reported borrowing money to provide care for the adopted child (Sedlak and Broadhurst, 1993).  
A 2005 survey found that nearly 60 percent of adoptive parents said that they would not have 
been able to adopt without adoption assistance. Among prospective adoptive parents, 45 percent 
said they would not adopt without it. (Children’s Rights, 2006).   
Whether adoption assistance provides adequate financial support for families who adopt 
children with special needs is an unanswered question.  States and localities design adoption 
assistance programs differently.  Some set rates high enough to provide general support and  7 
needed special services. Others set rates that support only basic care for a child and require that 
families request funds separately for needed special services. The NACAC reported that in the 
late 1990s the basic adoption assistance rates in four states were slightly greater than the United 
States Department of Agriculture [USDA] estimates of the cost of raising a child in a low-
income family. In three states the basic state subsidy was half the USDA estimate (Bower and 
Laws, 2002).  In the county-administered system of New York State, 52 of 57 counties provided 
adoption assistance payments less than the USDA’s child-cost estimate (Avery and Ferraro, 
1997).  Of course, these comparisons underestimate the adequacy of adoption assistance 
payments because the cost of raising an adopted child with special needs is likely to exceed the 
cost of raising a healthy child.  Direct outlay for care of the child plus the opportunity cost of lost 
time at work may be substantial.   
 
The AFCARS Adoption Data 
Congress prodded states to increase adoptions from foster care though the Adoption 
Incentive program articulated in the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-89).  To 
qualify for Adoption Incentive payments, states had to document increases in adoptions.  
Effectively this required states to come into compliance with a federal rule issued in 1993 
requiring the submission of data on adoptions with state agency involvement (Maza, 2000).  The 
data collection system is known as the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System 
(AFCARS).  The data are tabulated annually by the Children’s Bureau.  The Children’s Bureau 
publishes tabulations on the Web and in an annual outcomes report (e.g. US DHHS, 2006c).  The 
data used to produce the outcomes report form the basis for the public use version of the data, 
although the public use version may include updates made later by the states.  8 
States are required to submit data for each adoption in which a public child welfare 
agency was involved in any way.  Although states are encouraged to submit data for other 
adoptions, little has been submitted.  The analysis here is limited to cases with state agency 
involvement.   
Limitations of the Data 
The Children’s Bureau puts little faith in the AFCARS data for 1995 through 1997.
3  
Relatively few states were in compliance before fiscal year 1998.  For example, in 1995, just 31 
states submitted some adoption data to AFCARS.  Moreover, the data submitted were 
incomplete.   
For fiscal year 1996, 10 percent of adoption cases reported in AFCARS include invalid 
observations of whether the state had claimed Title IV-E reimbursement.  Of reported adoptions 
in 1997, 5.6 percent are missing information on whether Title IV-E reimbursement was claimed.  
The AFCARS data on Title IV-E claims are fairly complete after 1997.  Only 0.1 to 0.3 percent 
of observations for 1998 through 2003 are incomplete.  The AFCARS information on adoption 
assistance payments is almost fully complete.  Missing observations constitute less than three 
percent of submitted records for 1996 through 2003.
4  
Although the first years of data are suspect, AFCARS represents the only source of case-
level data on adoptions with state agency involvement that is consistent in format across almost 
all states and over time.  Moreover, at least at the state level, the AFCARS count for fiscal year 
1996 is highly correlated with data reported through other sources (Hansen and Hansen, 2006). 
  9 
National Trends in Adoption Assistance 
Since fiscal year 1996, states have claimed federal Title IV-E reimbursement for, on 
average, 69 percent of adoptions from foster care (table 1).  The average across years, however, 
obscures a marked increase early in the period; see table 1 and figure 2.  For fiscal years 1996 
and 1997, states claimed Title IV-E reimbursement for less than 50 percent of all adoptions made 
with state agency involvement (or 53 to 58 percent of valid observations).  In each of fiscal years 
1998 through 2003, states claimed Title IV-E reimbursement for more than 70 percent of 
adoptions.  The greatest number and percentage of adoptions for which Title IV-E 
reimbursement was claimed was for fiscal year 2000, in which 37,961 adoptions (75.1 percent of 
valid observations) were made with claim for reimbursement.  The percent of valid observations 
for which reimbursement was claimed fell thereafter to 68.8 percent for fiscal year 2003.
5 
The average monthly amount of adoption assistance reported in the 1996 through 2003 
AFCARS was $390, as shown in the first column of table 2.  The average amount in 1996 was 
$191, and the average increased each year.  The average in 2003 was $462, 1.4 times larger than 
in 1996. 
This average includes adoptions for which no monthly subsidy payment was planned at 
the time of the adoption.  Considering the entire period from fiscal year 1996 through 2003, more 
than 45,000 adoptions of the children from foster care were not supported with a monthly 
adoption assistance payment.  Unsupported adoptions represent over 15 percent of valid 
observations of adoption assistance payments.  In six states over 40 percent of adoption cases 
were recorded with $0 subsidy payments.
6  Among states that submitted AFCARS data in 1996, 
18 failed to support more than one-third of adoptions with a subsidy.    10 
As was the case with Title IV-E claims, there was an abrupt change from fiscal year 1997 
to fiscal year 1998 in the proportion of cases made without a monthly payment recorded.
7  The 
proportion with no support exceeded 35 percent in 1996, but fell to 17 percent in 1998.  After 
1998, the proportion of adoptions with state agency involvement but without adoption assistance 
held steady at 12 to 13 percent.  The precipitous fall is evident in figure 2, where the trend 
appears as a mirror image of increasing Title IV-E claims.
8 
When adoptions with no adoption assistance are excluded, the overall average subsidy 
amount rises to $460 per month.  The average in 1996 was $301; the average in 2003 was $523.   
The right-hand column of table 2 shows the average value of adoption assistance in cost-
of-living adjusted, constant 2000 dollars (adjustments made using American Federation of 
Teachers, various years, and US Dept. of Labor, 2006).  The increases in adoption assistance 
payments evident in the nominal values table are reduced, but not eliminated, by the adjustment. 
The value of adoption assistance in 2000 dollars increased from an average of $208 per month in 
1996 to $432 per month in 2003, an increase of 108 percent.  When payments of $0 are 
excluded, the value of the subsidy increased from $325 to $495 (in 2000 dollars), an increase of 
52 percent.  The increase in the nominal amount of the subsidy was 77 percent.  About one third 
of the purchasing power of the increase in adoption assistance was offset by inflation. 
One reason why the average of adoption assistance at the time of the adoption rose is that 
older children are supported by higher subsidy, and there was an increase in the representation of 
older children among newly adopted children.  Adoptions of infants (age less than one year) 
were supported with an average subsidy of $192; adoptions of toddlers (age 1 to 3) were 
supported with an average of $343 per month.  Monthly subsidies for children 5 to 8 averaged 
$400; for children 8-10, $425; children over 10, $442.    11 
A second cause of increasing levels of adoption assistance payments was increases in the 
amounts of the basic rates states.  The real basic rate for a two year old increased from an 
average of $364 in 1996 to $515 in 2003.  The basic rate for an eight year old increased from 
$409 in 1996 to $577 in 2003.
9 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the values (in cost-of-living adjusted, constant 2000 
dollars) of monthly adoption assistance payments at the time of the adoption.   Considering the 
entire period from 1996 through 2003, about 17 percent of adoptions were made with adoption 
assistance of $1 to $250 per month.  Over one-third of adoptions were supported with payments 
of between $250 and $450.  About 22 percent had payments between $450 and $750, and about 
7.5 percent had in excess of $750. 
Although the upper tail of the distribution is relatively thin, there was a noticeable 
increase in its thickness over time: there were three times more adoption assistance agreements 
made at the highest amounts in the later years than in the earlier years.  An exceptionally high 
monthly payment may be the result of effort to meet the needs of children with expensive-to-
support disabilities, or it may be the result of negotiation between the adoptive parent and the 
child welfare authority.  Again, although some states stick to a fairly rigid schedule in the 
determination of adoption assistance, most jurisdictions use the basic rates as a guide and 
determine the actual payments on a case-by-cases basis.
10     
Among adoptions with any support, less support is given to adoptions for which no 
federal reimbursement was claimed.  If the recorded adoption assistance subsidy is greater than 
zero and the child is not Title IV-E eligible, it implies that the subsidy supporting the adoption is 
funded entirely at the state and local level.  From fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2003, a 
total of 46,714 adoptions (almost 15 percent) fit this category; these adoption cases have positive  12 
values of monthly adoption subsidy but Title IV-E assistance was not claimed.  Table 4 shows 
the percent and number of cases for which a state-funded adoption assistance payment was 
recorded.  The prevalence of state-funded adoption assistance payments has risen from 13.3 
percent of adoptions in 1996 to 19.9 percent in 2003.  Table 4 shows that, averaging across 
years, state-funded adoption assistance is $40 dollars less than when the federal government pays 
a share.  The next section of the paper begins with a discussion of the role of Title IV-E 
eligibility in the determination of adoption assistance receipt and amount. 
 
Case Characteristics and Adoption Assistance 
The probability of receiving adoption assistance is expected to depend upon whether the 
state can be reimbursed through the federal program.  If the child is Title IV-E eligible, then we 
expect the probability of subsidy to be higher than if she is not.  The effect of claiming Title IV-
E reimbursement on the probability of receiving adoption assistance is positive, as shown in the 
first column of table 5.  This column reports the marginal effects from a logit estimation that 
includes fixed effects for state.  Most of the work of predicting the probability of receipt is done 
by this single variable.  The cost to the state of supporting any particular adoption is higher, and 
likelihood of assistance receipt is lower, if the state’s basic rate is higher.
11 
Since children must have a state-designated special need for the state to claim Title IV-E 
reimbursement, it is not obvious that special needs designations should have any additional 
impact on the probability of receipt.  The marginal effects of the special needs designations and 
recorded disabilities, however, are positive and disabilities are mostly positive.  Having a special 
need of older age or having siblings who also need an adoptive family adds the most to the 
likelihood of receiving adoption assistance.  However, all other things equal, a child who is  13 
mentally retarded or has a visual or hearing impairment is less likely to receive adoption 
assistance.  
The key question is whether, after accounting for the characteristics of the child, the 
characteristics of the adoptive family has an impact on the probability of receiving adoption 
assistance.  Avery and Ferraro (1997) argue that the differences in subsidy support cannot be 
well explained by the characteristics of the children.  Hansen and Pollack (2005) argue that the 
bargaining power that the adoptive family feels they have relative to the child welfare authority 
influenced the likelihood and amount of adoption assistance payments in 2001.   
After controlling for the characteristics of the child, children adopted by single parents, as 
compared to married or unmarried couples, are less likely to receive adoption assistance.  
Children adopted by kin are also less likely to receive support.  This is consistent with earlier 
findings (Geen, 2003, for example) and may reflect historical differences in the way states view 
kinship care (Dalberth et al., 2005).   
The estimated effects of the case characteristics on the monthly amount of the adoption 
assistance, given that assistance is received, are shown in column 2 of table 5.
12  The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the monthly adoption assistance subsidy.  The method of 
estimation is fixed effects using OLS.  Standard errors are computed using the 
Huber/White/sandwich VCE estimator to correct for heteroskedasticity within states.  
If the state can claim Title-IV-E reimbursement on behalf of the child, the adoption 
assistance payment is 16 percent higher than if reimbursement cannot be claimed.  Increases in 
the state basic rate are not passed through one-to-one to negotiated rates.  Specific disabilities 
increase the amount of the monthly payment from two to seven percent, but special needs 
designations do not increase payments much.    14 
As in the logit model, the fixed effects model shows that family characteristics play a role 
in distribution of adoption assistance, even after controlling for child characteristics.  A child 
adopted by kin receives 10 percent less than a child adopted by his or her foster parents.  
Children who are adopted by adults with whom they had no prior relationship receive 12 percent 
less than children adopted by their foster parents.  Children adopted by single women receive 
about one percent more than those adopted by couples; children adopted by single men receive 
about one percent less. 
The fixed effects results hint at the extent of unequal treatment in the distribution of the 
adoption assistance entitlement, but they cannot adequately describe differences between states 
in the administration of the program.  In fact, the estimation of a single parameter for each case 
characteristic implies that all cases are drawn from identical distributions.  However, if state 
administration differs, then observations are drawn from a different distribution in each state.  To 
gauge the importance of differences in state administration, I first consider a linear Gaussian 
mixed model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005).  The mixed model allows estimation of 
common coefficients across states (here on the log of the basic rate) and random coefficients (on 
the other case characteristics) in the same model.  That the coefficients are treated as random 
means that they are allowed to differ across states as the result of a stochastic process; in other 
words, the model specifically allows the system of determination of adoption assistance to be 
unique to each state.  The coefficients reported in column 3 of table 5 are the weighted averages 
of the OLS coefficients, where the weights are proportional to the covariance matrices of the 
OLS coefficients.
13  The values in parentheses are the estimates of the variances of the processes 
generating the coefficients; they do not describe the sampling distribution of the estimator.  15 
The estimated variances of the processes are large.  The hypothesis that the true effects of 
case characteristics on adoption assistance payments are the same across states is rejected, at a 
high level of confidence.
14  The coefficients cannot be adequately described by their point 
estimates—such as the ones reported in column 2 of table 5—because they are unlikely to have 
been generated by identical processes in each state. 
To further assess the importance of administrative differences, I considered the results of 
separate OLS regressions for each state.  The individual state regressions are of the general form 
presented in column 2 of table 5.  Table 6 summarizes the range of the estimated coefficients in 
the individual state regressions.   At least one state had a negative coefficient on each case 
characteristic, while others had positive coefficients.  The widest range in effects of 
characteristics of the children was for children with special medical needs.  The widest range in 
effects of characteristics of the adopted family was for children adopted by single fathers.  
Finally, for each case characteristic, the distribution of the coefficients had at least one thick tail, 
that is, the wide range of values is not the product of just one outlier.  For each of the 
coefficients, at least 15 states had estimated coefficients outside two standard deviations from the 
average.   
 
Conclusion 
Clearly the state administration of the federal adoption assistance entitlement program 
generates unequal support for children adopted from foster care and the families who step 
forward to take responsibility for them.  In the past, state control has been advocated as a way to 
enable states to increase the pool of local families to meet local need.  Yet there remain many 
states with more waiting children than approved families, while other states have more families  16 
than waiting children (Hansen and Hansen, 2006; Wilson, Katz, and Geen, 2005).  Congress has 
recognized the need to improve the system that supports the interstate placements of children 
(US GAO, 1999); it may also be wise for Congress to consider imposing a national structure on 
the adoption assistance program to ensure that the needs of all children waiting in foster care are 
met.  A next step for research, then, is to examine whether states that follow a strict formula for 
allocation of adoption assistance payments create more adoptions than states that spend resources 
bargaining over adoption assistance. 
Meanwhile, Congress can remove an obstacle to equal funding of all adoptions from 
foster care by states.  Recall that for the state to claim Title IV-E reimbursement on behalf of a 
child, the child must have state-defined special needs and must either qualify for federal SSI or 
must have been removed from a family that would have qualified for benefits under Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children at the time of removal.  Of course, because AFDC was 
replaced by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, AFDC eligibility criteria are no 
longer updated.  The AFDC look-back likely accounts for much of the increase in the percentage 
of all payments that are funded solely with state monies (shown in table 4).  A 2004 Pew 
Commission report suggested de-linking adoption assistance from the out-dated AFDC criteria 
(Pew Commission, 2004), and Senator Rockefeller and Representatives Herger and Cardin 
introduced bills intended to free states from the worry that federal matching funds will disappear.  
None of their bills emerged from committee.
15 
  17 
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Table 1.  Title IV-E Claims (Percent of Adoptions) 
  No Claim  Claimed  Missing   Total 
1996  48.0 42.1% 10.0  100 
1997 54.6 39.8  5.6  100 
1998 28.5 71.4  0.1  100 
1999 25.1 74.9  0.1  100 
2000 24.8 75.0  0.2  100 
2001 25.7 74.0  0.3  100 
2002 26.4 73.4  0.2  100 
2003 31.1 68.6  0.3  100 
Average 29.8  69.1  1.0  100 
 
Source: Calculation of author from the AFCARS Public Use Adoption Data. 23 
Table 2. Adoption Assistance Payments by Year 
 
  In Current Dollars 
In COL-Adjusted 
2000 Dollars 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Including Payments of $0 
1996 191  234 208  255 
1997 229  238 245  254 
1998 350  263 376  286 
1999 375  264 394  279 
2000 401  270 402  272 
2001 425  286 411  275 
2002 436  287 416  266 
2003 462  339 432  296 
Average 390  291  387  282 
Excluding Payments of $0 
1996 301  230 325  253 
1997 319  223 338  240 
1998 413  235 440  260 
1999 434  235 452  250 
2000 460  237 459  241 
2001 488  251 470  243 
2002 495  254 469  235 
2003 532  309 495  264 
Average 460  260  454  251 
 
Source: Calculation of author from the AFCARS Public Use Adoption Data. 24 
 
Table 3. Distribution of Adoption Assistance Payments (COL-Adjusted 2000 Dollars) 
  Percent of Payments in Range 









1996  36.0 18.0 32.1 10.4  2.4  1.1 
1997  27.5 18.5 37.6 13.0  2.5  0.9 
1998  13.9 21.5 40.0 17.5  4.6  2.5 
1999  11.7 19.4 41.9 19.5  5.0  2.7 
2000  11.6 16.2 42.3 22.9  4.5  2.5 
2001  11.7 14.7 41.5 24.2  5.2  2.7 
2002  10.7 15.0 39.3 27.2  5.7  2.1 
2003  12.1 18.2 30.0 29.4  7.3  3.0 
Average  13.8 17.4 38.7 22.6  5.1  2.4 
 
Source: Calculation of author from the AFCARS Public Use Adoption Data. 25 
Table 4. State-Funded Adoption Assistance Payments (constant 2000 dollars) 
 
 COL-Adjusted  2000  Dollars 




Funded  Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
1996  13.3 376 238 345 232 
1997  15.7 377 226 324 232 
1998  15.9 445 264 413 247 
1999  14.1 459 253 413 238 
2000  13.9 464 242 426 238 
2001  14.6 472 242 456 248 
2002  16.2 476 235 435 233 
2003  19.9 506 265 454 257 
Average  15.6 464 250 426 246 
 
Source: Calculation of author from the AFCARS Public Use Adoption Data. 26 
Table 5. Effects of Case Characteristics on Probability of Receipt and Amount of Adoption 
Assistance 




Fixed Effects Model  Mixed Model 
Dependent Variable  Receives AA  Ln(Amount) if Receives AA 
Title IV-E Eligible  0.3362  (0.0022)  0.160  (0.007)  0.213  (0.184) 
Ln(Basic Rate)  -0.0156  (0.0009) -0.090  (0.040)  0.007  (0.006) 
Special Need: Minority Race  0.0073  (0.0006)  0.220  (0.015)  0.293  (0.135) 
Special Need: Older Age  0.0121  (0.0006)  0.236  (0.013)  0.313  (0.132) 
Special  Need:  Siblings  0.0148  (0.0005)  0.298 (0.014) 0.320 (0.137) 
Special  Need:  Medical  0.0083  (0.0007)  0.243 (0.017) 0.322 (0.140) 
Special  Need:  Other  0.0028  (0.0005)  0.298 (0.016) 0.202 (0.125) 
Mental  Retardation  -0.0037  (0.0015) 0.005 (0.021) -0.024 (0.047) 
Sensory  Impairment  -0.0029  (0.0018)  0.131 (0.020) 0.026 (0.046) 
Physical  Disability  0.0089  (0.0008)  0.065 (0.017) 0.072 (0.051) 
Emotional  Disturbance  0.0074  (0.0006)  0.083 (0.012) 0.041 (0.034) 
Other  Diagnosed  Condition  0.0043  (0.0006)  0.091 (0.011) 0.058 (0.031) 
Single  Adoptive  Mom  0.0039  (0.0005)  0.007 (0.004) 0.032 (0.030) 
Single Adoptive Dad  -0.0005  (0.0013)  -0.008 (0.014) -0.028 (0.050) 
Kinship Adoption  -0.0056  (0.0006)  -0.098 (0.005) -0.050 (0.039) 
Stranger Adoption  -0.0200  (0.0008)  -0.120 (0.009) -0.064 (0.033) 
N  221,144 195,508 195,508 
Pseudo R2  0.41       
Percent Successes Correctly Predicted  92       
Percent Failures Correctly Predicted  61       
R2     0.04     27 
Wald  Chi-Square      125 
 
Notes: All models include state fixed effects and year effects.  Constant terms, and individual 
case effects of age, rate, and sex estimated but not reported.  For models (1) and (2) standard 
errors appear in parentheses.  See text for interpretation of reported values in model (3). 
Sources: All data except basic rates from the AFCARS Public Use Adoption Data.  Basic rates  
from NACAC archive of State Adoption Subsidy Profiles (see note 8). 
  28 
Table 6. Summary of State Regressions 
 
Number of Coefficients  
More than Two  
Standard Deviations from Zero 
Min. Max. 
Special Need: Age  20  -0.33  5.40 
Special Need: Race 20  -0.97  5.30 
Special Need: Siblings  22  -0.93  5.40 
Special Need: Medical  24  -0.90  5.40 
Special Need: Other  18  -0.94  5.30 
Mental Retardation  15  -0.97  1.40 
Sensory  Impairment 17 -0.52  2.16 
Physical Disability  18  -0.88  1.64 
Emotional Disturbance  19  -0.59  1.15 
Single Mom  20  -0.07  0.95 
Single Dad  16  -0.93  1.70 
Kin Adoption  23  -0.61  1.25 
Stranger Adoption  21  -0.46  0.78 
 
Sources: See table 6. 29 
Figure 1 
Adoptions with State Agency Involvement, 1995-2004 
 








  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 30 
Figure 2. Trend in Title IV-E Claims and Unsupported Adoptions 
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Notes 
 
1 The state’s basic monthly amount of adoption assistance is usually calculated from a per diem 
rate that is set at the state level in all but four states.  New York State and three other states allow 
counties to set the basic adoption assistance rate. 
2 States may also offer deferred payment agreements, which allow families in the adoption data 
the option of negotiating a subsidy at a later date even if they do not opt to receive the subsidy at 
the time of adoption.  I treat the 528 deferrals in the data as non-receipt.  In 1983 federally-
funded adoption assistance became portable across state lines.  In 1986, reimbursement for non-
recurring expenses such as the home study and legal fees were added to Title IV-E.  Also in 
1986, Congress allowed Medicaid-only adoption assistance grants and guaranteed their 
portability across state lines.  In 1997, Congress added that once a child had become entitled to 
adoption assistance, the entitlement would follow the child even if an adoption disrupted so that 
subsequent adoptive families were assured of receiving adoption assistance. 
3 The User’s Guide and Codebook states: “Adoptions finalized in years prior to FY 1998 are not 
being updated because most states indicated that those data were not credible” (NDACAN, p. 9). 
4  Most of the missing observations are for New York State.  Very incomplete data for five or 
more out of the seven years used here are from Illinois, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. 
5 Alaska, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, and Vermont requested IV-E reimbursement in about 
80 percent of cases.  These states were among those that paid the highest amounts of assistance.  
Five states made Title IV-E claims in less than 40 percent of adoptions. 
6 The states are Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico.  32 
 
7 The change is so abrupt in a few states (such as Delaware and Minnesota) that it likely due to 
inaccuracies in the AFCARS data.  However, removing these states from the analysis does not 
change the overall upward trend in the proportion of adoptions supported. 
8 Children who were younger than one year old at the time of finalization were least likely to be 
placed with adoption assistance. All age groups exhibit an increasing trend in the likelihood of 
support with an adoption subsidy. 
9 Calculated from NACAC archive of State Adoption Subsidy Profiles.  The author thanks 
Jeanette W. Bower for her assistance in obtaining these data.  Current values available from 
NACAC (2006). 
10 The average of the monthly adoption assistance payments as recorded in AFCARS is greater 
than the basic rate in 16 states.  New York, Maryland, Oklahoma, Michigan have the lowest 
coefficient of variation in their adoption subsidies.  New York State, Alabama, Massachusetts, 
Wyoming, Puerto Rico and Minnesota each have fewer than 30 distinct values of recorded 
adoption assistance payments in AFCARS.  This suggests that these states do not allow for much 
negotiation when adoption assistance agreements are made with adoptive parents. 
11 The basic subsidy rate for each child is calculated as the nearest age-specific rate available in 
the NACAC archive of State Adoption Subsidy Profiles.  Dalberth, et al. (2005) find that the 
FMAP rate matters, but I find that the FMAP rate does not have an effect independent of its 
effect on the basic rate. 
12 Although selection on observables is clear, it is reasonable to wonder about selection on 
unobservables.  No adequate instrument is available in the AFCARS data set, so no traditional 
selection correction model can be applied.  Given the success of the complete logit model (see 
table 5), and following the argument of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005), the degree of selection  33 
 
on the unobervables would have to be many times greater than the selection on observables in 
order for selection bias to be large enough to account for the entirety of the effect of family 
characteristics on adoption assistance payments. 
13 Ignoring the year effects for simplicity of notation, the mixed model is regression equation is 
ij j ij ij ij t B x z s ε β + + + = 1 , where s is the amount of the subsidy, z is the basic rate on which a 
common parameter is estimated, and the xs are case characteristics upon which the parameter B 
is allowed to be different across j states. 
14 . 4 . 1
5 2 e = χ   
15 Most recently, Sen. John D. Rockefeller (D-WV) introduced S. 1539 (A bill to amend part E 
of title IV of the Social Security Act to promote the adoption of children with special needs) on 
July 28, 2005.  Rep. Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) introduced H.R. 1534 (Child Protective Services 
Improvement Act) on April 1, 2003.  Rep. Herger introduced H.R. 4856 (Child Safety, Adoption, 
and Family Enhancement Act) on July 19, 2004. 